Committee Overview
The UN Security Council is convened in emergency session on 16 October 1962. Aerial reconnaissance photographs have confirmed Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 ballistic missiles in Cuba — capable of striking Washington D.C. in minutes. President Kennedy has formed ExComm. Khrushchev denies offensive intent. Fifteen delegates hold the fate of the world.
Historical Context: The Thirteen Days
The Cuban Missile Crisis (16–28 October 1962) is the closest humanity has come to nuclear war. The US imposed a naval "quarantine" — legally contested as a blockade. The USSR maintained missiles were defensive. Cuba asserted sovereign rights. Back-channel diplomacy, not open negotiation, ultimately resolved the crisis:
- RFK's secret meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin produced the eventual deal
- Soviet withdrawal for US pledge of non-invasion of Cuba
- Secret US withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey
- The Vasily Arkhipov incident: a Soviet submarine officer's refusal to launch a nuclear torpedo may have saved the world
Format & Procedure
- Standard UNSC Rules of Procedure — P5 veto rights apply
- Procedural motions require 9 affirmative votes, no veto
- Opening speeches: P5 members 3 minutes, non-permanent 90 seconds
- Crisis directives will be issued during Day 1 afternoon session
- Unmoderated caucuses permitted for back-channel negotiations
Topic A: Verifiable Withdrawal of Soviet Offensive Weapons from Cuba
Background
On 14 October 1962, U-2 reconnaissance aircraft photographed Soviet missile sites under construction in Cuba. The sites could house SS-4 MRBMs (range 2,000km) and SS-5 IRBMs (range 4,000km). The US naval quarantine of Cuba was imposed on 24 October. Soviet cargo ships carrying military hardware approached the blockade line. The world watched.
Key Questions for Debate
- Legal status of the quarantine: Was the US naval blockade legal under UN Charter Article 2(4)? Or was it an act of war requiring Chapter VII authorization?
- Soviet justification: Were the missiles genuinely defensive, invited by a sovereign state under Article 2(1)? How does the Council evaluate this?
- Verification: Any withdrawal agreement requires independent, credible inspection. Who provides it — IAEA? UN observers? How do you verify IRBM site dismantlement?
- Cuban sovereignty: Cuba — excluded from superpower negotiations — demanded equal status. How does the UNSC balance P5 interests against smaller state rights?
- The Turkey analogy: Khrushchev demanded withdrawal of US Jupiter missiles from Turkey. Does the Council acknowledge this linkage publicly or privately?
- P5 veto deadlock: With both USA and USSR holding vetoes, what mechanism exists for the UNSC to produce a binding resolution?
Possible Resolution Directions
- UN-supervised inspection regime for Cuban missile sites under IAEA
- Mutual stand-down: Soviet ships halt, US pauses quarantine interceptions
- Secretary-General mediation framework — U Thant precedent
- Caribbean Nuclear-Free Zone declaration (precedent for Tlatelolco 1967)
- Emergency hotline establishment between Washington and Moscow
📄 Position Paper Required
600–900 words. Cover both topics, country position, red lines, one concrete proposal. Due: January 8, 2027
Topic B: Establishing a Superpower Conflict Prevention Framework
Background
Even if the immediate crisis is resolved, the structural conditions that produced it remain: nuclear parity, mutual suspicion, absent communication channels, and proxy conflicts. Topic B asks delegates to draft forward-looking architecture — what institutions and agreements could prevent the next Cuba?
Key Questions
- Direct superpower communication: Should the UNSC mandate a permanent hotline between Washington and Moscow? How is it institutionalised?
- Caribbean Nuclear-Free Zone: Can a Tlatelolco-model zone be established immediately? What verification architecture is required?
- Crisis management protocols: Standing procedures for superpower confrontation — cooling-off periods, mandatory UN notification, observers in conflict zones
- Definition of offensive weapons: The crisis turned on "offensive vs defensive" distinctions. Can the Council establish a legally operative definition?
- Role of small states: What rights do proxy states like Cuba have? What obligations do superpowers have toward them?
- MAD and UNSC authority: Does mutual deterrence doctrine effectively bypass UNSC authority when both parties hold vetoes?
Day 1 — Saturday, January 23, 2027
09:00–09:45
Opening Ceremony
SG address, keynote, committee dispatch
10:00–10:20
Roll Call & Agenda Adoption
Confirm attendance, adopt Topic A
10:20–11:30
Opening Speeches — Topic A
P5: 3 min · Non-permanent: 90 sec
11:30–11:45
Recess
Bloc consultations, informal lobbying
11:45–13:15
Moderated Caucus I
Legal status of the quarantine: formal debate
13:15–14:00
Lunch Break
Bloc whips circulate position summaries
14:00–15:30
Unmoderated Caucus
Bloc formation, working paper drafting, back-channel diplomacy
15:30–16:00
Moderated Caucus II
Verification mechanisms — IAEA inspection debate
16:00–16:30
⚡ CRISIS DIRECTIVE
Emergency crisis directive issued. 30-minute emergency debate begins.
16:30–17:30
Emergency Session
Crisis response, emergency draft resolution
Day 2 — Sunday, January 24, 2027
09:30–11:00
Topic B Debate
Long-term conflict prevention framework; cross-bloc proposals
11:00–11:15
Recess
Final lobbying, no new resolutions after this
11:15–13:00
Voting Procedure
Final amendments, roll-call votes, explanations of vote
13:00–14:00
Lunch — Awards Deliberation
Chairs decide awards
14:00–14:45
Keynote Address
Distinguished speaker: Cold War lessons for today
15:00–16:00
Closing Ceremony & Awards
Best Delegate, Outstanding, Commendation, Best Paper
Historical positions as of October 1962. Delegates are not bound to bloc votes — cross-bloc coalitions are encouraged, especially among non-aligned members.
Western Bloc
USA, UK, France, Canada, Australia
Demand immediate, verifiable withdrawal of Soviet offensive weapons. Support the quarantine as legitimate collective self-defense under the OAS Charter. Will veto any resolution legitimising Soviet missile installations.
Eastern / Soviet Bloc
USSR, Cuba, Romania, Bulgaria
Maintain missiles were defensive, invited by a sovereign state. Demand US pledge of non-invasion of Cuba and withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey. Will veto UN inspection mandates without explicit Cuban consent.
Non-Aligned Movement
India, Egypt, Ghana, Yugoslavia
Seek peaceful negotiated resolution without choosing sides. Propose mutual stand-down, UN mediation, and a Caribbean nuclear-free zone. Press for genuine multilateralism over superpower bilateralism.
Latin American Bloc
Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, Chile
Most directly threatened by both Soviet missiles and any US military action. Support OAS collective defense while insisting on Cuban sovereignty. Favour long-term nuclear-free zone for the region.
African / Asian Bloc
Kenya, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Japan, Philippines
Concerned about superpower confrontation destabilising decolonisation. Japan presses for disarmament commitments given 1945 history. Pakistan navigates complex US alliance relationship.